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California's Attempt To End Farmworker
Voicelessness: A Survey Of The Agricultural
Labor Relations Act Of 1975
On June 5, 1975, California enacted the first comprehensive farm
labor legislation to provide a mechanism for regulation of the collective
bargaining process in agriculture for the nation's principal farm state.1
The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (hereinafter referred to
as ALRA or Act) was enacted as a legislative response to ten years of
strife and recurring labor disputes experienced by labor and manage-
ment in California's agribusiness, and has filled a void created by the
agricultural exemption existing under federal law since 1935.2
This comment will begin by documenting a brief history of the
federal legislation which regulates collective bargaining and the princi-
pal objectives precipitating their enactment. It will continue by demon-
strating that legislation existing in California prior to enactment of the
ALRA was not only inadequate to peacefully resolve the continuing and
heightening unrest in farm labor, but was also totally contradictory, in
policy and effect, to the principal objectives of the National Labor
Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as NLRA or Federal Act) of
promoting majority representation. Finally, the comment will focus on
certain provisions of the ALRA which are deemed crucial to the promo-
tion of social and economic justice in a seasonal occupation. The analy-
sis will compare parallel provisions of the NLRA and will demonstrate
the departure from applicable precedent of the Federal Act deemed
necessary by the California Legislature in order to resolve issues particu-
larly identifiable to the nature of the farm labor crisis in California.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATION
OF LABOR RELATIONS
It has been suggested that the Industrial Revolution of the mid-
eighteenth century brought about the advent of the labor movement in
1. CAL. LABOR CODE §1140 et seq., S.B. 1, CAL. STATS. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess.,
c. 1, §-, at -. The effective date of S.B. 1 was Aug. 28, 1975. CAL. CONST. art.
4, §8, cl. (c)(1).
2. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §2(3), 49 Stat. 449, as amended by
Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, Act of Oct. 22, 1951, Pub. L.
No. 82-189, 65 Stat. 601, Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-791, 72 Stat. 945, Act
of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L, No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1970).
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the United States. 8 With the rise of the factory system, the self-sustaining
independent tradesman was replaced by mechanization and became de-
pendent upon another for his means of economic support.4 This emer-
gence of the employee-employer relationship resulted in a conflict of
economic goals, and opposition between management and labor began
to grow.5 The employer's interest in maintaining his operations at the
lowest expense, thereby enabliiig him to reap the maximum profit
possible, resulted in a payment of minimum wages and the provision of
less than desirable working conditions for his employees.0 As individual
workers were powerless in their efforts to obtain higher wages and
shorter hours by attempting to force their employer to comply with
demands for better working conditions, the workers began to form
groups7 which were able to exert pressure on the employer. Because
these groups represented a substantial portion of the employer's work
force, a concerted agreement to stop work detrimentally affected the
employer's operations to such an extent that he would be forced to
concede to their demands, such a concession being a prerequisite to their
return to work.8
After the 1873 Depression, rising prices precipitated increased de-
mands by labor, and concerted work stoppages and strike activity began
to escalate.9 As a response to this increase in strikes, picketing and
boycotting, employers began to seek relief from the equity courts
through injunctions against further coercive economic tactics by their
employees.'
0
Prior to this point in time, the American government had assumed an
economic and political laissez faire posture with respect to relations
between an employee and his employer."' This policy of nonintervention
by the federal government resulted in governmental abstention from
interference with the parties to a wage bargain. Thus, the organizational
or collective action of workers as a group was left unregulated.'2 With
the increase in labor disputes after the 1873 depression, the governmen-
tal noninterventionist policy began to break down and the equity courts
3. M. FoRxoscH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAw 142 (2nd ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as FoRKoscH].
4. Foxoscir, supra note 3, at 142.
5. FoRKoscH, supra note 3, at 145.
6. FoRKoscH, supra note 3, at 15-16.
7. J. WiLLTAMs, LABOR REMTIONS Am THE LAW 34 (3rd ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as WmLiAMs].
8. See WiLLTAMS, supra note 7, at 34.
9. FonKoscH, supra note 3, at §208.
10. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALF, L.J. 825, 832 (1926) [herein-
after cited as Witte].
11. FoRxoscg, supra note 3, at 14.
12. See FoRnoscH, supra note 3, at 14.
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began to issue the injunctions sought by employers to prevent further
coercive activity by their employees.' " Labor unions began to charge
that the government, by allowing the courts to maintain jurisdiction, was
supporting one side of the labor dispute rather than equitably attempt-
ing to maintain or reach a just balance.
14
To meet labor's demand for an end to arbitrarily issued injunctions
against the union's economic tactics, Congress passed the Norris-La-
Guardia Anti-Injunction Act in 1932.11 Section 2 of the Act expresses
the underlying policy of the Act, stating that although it was instituted as
an anti-injunction act, its passage was primarily aimed at alleviating the
injunctive barrier to the workers' struggle to obtain employment security
through collective bargaining.18
One year after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress
passed The National Industrial Recovery Act (hereinafter referred to as
NIRA), the first New Deal legislation to deal specifically with collective
bargaining between employees and employers.1 This legislation was an
attempt by Congress to stimulate the economy and begin an upsurge in
the decline caused by the stock market crash of 1929.18 The NIRA was
subsequently declared unconstitutional; 9 however, in 1935, the National
Labor Relations Act was enacted.
20
As has been seen, labor relations on a federal level prior to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act had been left unregulated. Employees were free, how-
ever, to group together and to exert pressure on their employer in an
attempt to force him to recognize and concede to their -demands for
13. FonoscH, supra note 3, at 369. The articulated theory supporting the issu-
ance of the injunctions was the doctrine that equity courts should intervene to protect
the public from nuisances. Witte, supra note 9, at 834.
14. Report of the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations, Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, State Court Injunctions, S. Doc. No. 7, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1951).
15. Act of March 23, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, §§1-15, 47 Stat. 70, currently
29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (1970). The Act provides that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes except as provided in the Act. The
Act thus destroyed the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in connection with
most labor disputes. WILLIAms, supra note 7, at 46.
16. Section 2 of the Act provides in part that "the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and. . . that he shall be free
from . . . coercion of employers of labor . . . for purposes of collective bargaining."
29 U.S.C. §102 (1970).
17. See C. Moius, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 25-26 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as MoRuus].
18. W. MIERNYcK, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND COLLECTIVE BARGANrnG 239
(2nd ed. 1973).
19. Sehecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The NIRA was
declared unconstitutional on two grounds. First, it attempted an unconstitutional delega-
tion of power to the President, and second, it exceeded the commerce power.
20. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§1-16, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29
U.S.C. §§151-168 (1970). The NLRA of 1935 was a product of a far-reaching bill in-
troduced in Congress by Senator Robert Wagner in an effort to provide federal support
to employee organizations and to collective bargaining. The original NLRA is the ori-
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better working conditions. 21 In passing the NLRA, Congress acknowl-
edged that because the employer was not required to negotiate with his
employees, an inequality of bargaining power existed.22 Accordingly,
wage rates were depressed, detrimentally affecting the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and leading to recurring business depres-
sions.23 Tie refusal of some employers to negotiate terms and conditions
of employment precipitated industrial strife and unrest leading to strikes,
and materially burdened interstate commerce. 24 To alleviate the disrup-
tion occasioned by lack of employer response to employee demands,
Congress provided in the NLRA that the employer must bargain collec-
tively with his employees.25
To effectively carry out the policies of Congress, the NLRA provided
a comprehensive regulatory scheme to enable employees to be represent-
ed in negotiations with the employer during the collective bargaining
process. The Act provided for secret ballot elections of the bargaining
representative, 2 6 required the employer to bargain in good faith with a
representative of the employees' choosing,27 delineated certain unfair
labor practices by the employer28 and created an administrative board20
to enforce the substantive rights of employees. Since Congress had
determined that the economic power was balanced in favor of manage-
ment,30 the NLRA of 1935 provided no prohibitions on the activities of
labor groups, resulting in dissatisfaction with the Act on the part of
employers. 31 Among the employers who voiced strong opposition were
gin of modem labor law. MoRms, supra note 17, at 26-27.
The constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act was upheld in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
21. The theory in the early cases was that it was illegal for workers to combine
to raise wages. Conduct as such could result in indictments for criminal conspiracy.
Professor Witte indicates that the theory for these early conspiracy cases in the late
1800's was soon abandoned. See WrrrE, supra note 10, at 826.
22. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §1, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29 U.S.C.
§151 (1970).
23. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-193, §1, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29 U.S.C.
§151 (1970).
24. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937).
25. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §8(5), 49 Stat. 449, currently 29
U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1970).
26. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-193, §9, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29 U.S.C.
§159 (1970).
27. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §8(5), 49 Stat. 449, currently 29
U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1970).
28. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §8, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29 U.S.C
§158(a) (1970).
29. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L.
No. 74-198 §3, 49 Stat. 449, currently 29 U.S.C. §153 (1970).
30. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937) wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the Wagner Act (the NLRA of 1935) was criti-
cized as being one-sided in that it subjected the employer to supervision and restraint,
leaving untouched abuses for which employees may be responsible.
31. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 463 (1966).
1976 / Agricultural Labor Relations Act
the southern growers.3 2 Senate debates over the NLRA reveal that in
order to avoid southern opposition to the Federal Act and thereby
effectuate its passage, a certain concession was necessary. 3 Such a
concession was made and the new collective bargaining law for the
protection of the labor force of the country exempted from its coverage1
4
agricultural workers.
Under the legislative protection of the NLRA, employee labor organi-
zations increased in strength and number.' By 1947, Congress recog-
nized the necessity to restrict the activities of labor organizations and
amended the NLRA of 1935 by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947.36 The Taft-Hartley Act delineated unfair labor practices of labor
organizations, which had been specifically deleted from the NLRA of
1935, 3  and thus struck a new balance between labor and management.
Because of the agricultural exemption contained in the NLRA, it has
been ruled that a union composed exclusively of agricultural workers is
not a labor organization within the meaning of the Federal Act, and
agricultural unions have therefore not been subject to the restrictive
provisions of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA.as
CALIFORNIA'S REGULATION OF LABOR RELATIONS
PRIOR TO THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. A Noninterventionist Governmental Policy
Despite the recognized hardships which flow from unregulated labor-
management relations, California has failed to adopt a uniform, admin-
istrative system for the resolution of labor disputes.39 The California
32. Cf. id.
33. Cf. id.
34. 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1970). Although Congress promised it would return to
take care of the farm worker and has considered amending the NLRA to cover agricul-
tural workers, it has never extended the stabilizing protective mechanism to the nation's
farm industry. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 4769, a Bill
to amend the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, so as to make its provisions
applicable to Agriculture, 2 (1967).
35. Professor Morris cites one commentator who concluded in 1947 that the labor
movement in the United States was the "largest, the most powerful, and the most aggres-
sive that the world has ever seen." MoRus, supra note 17, at 35.
36. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, currently 29 U.S.C.
§§151-168 (1970). Professor Morris indicates that the emphasis in the House hearings
was on the investigation of abuse by labor of its power and that attention was focused
on the secondary boycott, closed-union shop agreements, strikes and picketing, jurisdic-
tional disputes, and corruption which had appeared in some unions. MoRRss, supra note
17, at 36-37.
37. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §8(b), 61 Stat. 136, currently 29
U.S.C. §158(b) (1970).
38. See DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869, 1951).
39. See Messner v. Journeyman Barbers, Etc., Int'l Union of Am., Local 256, 53
Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
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Labor Code does, however, set forth the state's public policy as it relates
to labor relations by declaring that agreements pertaining to conditions
of employment should flow from the voluntary actions of the parties.40
This policy extends to labor relations not subject to federal jurisdiction,
and was applied to labor-management relations in the agricultural sector
prior to enactment of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975. 4'
Although the state's policy has allowed employees to freely designate
a representative for the purposes of bargaining, 42 the California Su-
preme Court has reasserted the long-recognized rule that the determina-
tion by management of whether to bargain with a labor organization
should be left to the free interaction of economic forces, and thus the
employer has not been required to recognize or negotiate with his
employees' representative. 3 However, workers dissatisfied with condi-
tions of employment have been allowed to resort to various types of
peaceful striking, picketing and boycotting activity44 designed to coerce
the employer to recognize and bargain with their representative, in order
to secure satisfactory terms of employment through enforceable con-
tracts. Although concerted activities by employee groups are utilized for
differing purposes in the complex realm of labor-management relations,
it was the recognition strike which initially brought turmoil and violence
to the fields of California.45 It was also the recognition strike that was
early determined by the federal government and the United States
Supreme Court to be the principal cause of labor unrest before the
passage of the NLRA.4" Since the NLRA provides that the employer
must recognize and bargain with the representative of the employees'
choosing, it is fair to conclude that Congress believed such a require-
ment would prevent or substantially diminish the recurrence of further
recognition strikes.
Not only have employers in California been free to determine whether
or not to recognize a demanding labor organization, but should the
40. CAL. LABOR CODE §923.
41. CAL. LABOR CODE §§1157.7, 1140.4(b).
42. California Labor Code Section 923 declares that workers are free to organize
and that they may choose a representative for the purposes of negotiating with the em-
ployer over terms of employment.
43. E.g., Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455,
469-471, 349 P.2d 76, 85-86, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 479-480 (1960).
44. Messner v. Journeyman Barbers, Etc., Int'l Union of Am., Local 256, 53 Cal.
2d 873, 876, 351 P.2d 347, 349, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1960).
45. See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra.
46. 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970) states in the Findings and Policies that the refusal of
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining led to strikes.
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) the court recognized that refusal
of an employer to meet and confer with a representative of the employees' own choos-
ing had been one of the most prolific causes of strife.
See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
202
1976 / Agricultural Labor Relations Act
employer choose to negotiate, California law has not required that the
labor organization with whom the employer negotiates to be one which
is supported and desired by a majority or any of his employees.', In
interpreting the Federal Act, the United States Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, pointed out that the "theory of the Act
[NLRA] is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited repre-
sentatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace '4 8 and thus
the Court stated that the NLRA requires that an employer is prohibited
and may be enjoined from entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with anyone other than the representative selected by his employ-
ees.4
9
California's failure to require recognition and to prevent negotiation
with a nonrepresentative labor organization has been totally contradic-
tory to the NLRA and quite analogous to the federal non-interventionist
policy existing prior to the passage of the NLRA. The California
Supreme Court has acknowledged that to require compulsory bargain-
ing without the attendant legislation and a labor relations board to
police the process would create a host of problems a trial court would
not be equipped to handle. 0 Despite this acknowledgment, the Califor-
nia Legislature had continually failed to provide the state's agricultural
sector with the appropriate statutory mechanism so that compulsory
bargaining with its attendant stabilizing effect could be instituted. A
look at the exploitation of cheap labor by California growers, the
tenacity of a struggling young farm workers' union and finally the
intervention of a nonrepresentative labor organization powerful enough
to attain recognition by a mere threat will indicate why abstention by the
legislature was no longer adequate to prevent social and economic
injustice and no longer sufficient to remedy the volatile and unstable
condition in the agricultural fields of California.
B. Effect on California Agribusiness of the Absence of a Statutory
Scheme Regulating Labor-Management Relations
1. Historical Growth of Agribusiness
Documentation of the growth of California's largest industry, agri-
business, indicates a pattern of recruitment by California growers of
cheap labor beginning in the late 1800's.51 The pattern began when
47. See Petri Cleaners Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Inc., Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d
455, 472-74, 349 P.2d 76, 87-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481-82 (1951).
48. 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
49. Id. at 44-45.
50. Petri Cleaners Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Inc. Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455,
472, 349 P.2d 76, 87, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481 (1951).
51. J. Kiely, Report to Safeway on the Lettuce Labor Dispute 1-2 (1973). (Copy
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Chinese immigrants, initially brought into the state to work on railroads,
were impelled into the fields when Anglo hostility made life in the cities
undesirable. 52 This source of labor dissipated after Congress passed the
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.13 The growers then turned to the ever
increasing population of Japanese,5 4 until the Immigration Act of
192451 similarly excluded further Japanese entry into the United States.
The successors to the Japanese were the Filipinos, whom the growers
brought in from Hawaii.5" By 1940, 25 percent of California's farm
labor force was seasonal, and was composed principally of resident
Mexicans, migrants from out of state, Filipinos, Japanese and Hindus. 7
With these various nationalities in the fields, the growers had established
differing wage rates for the various ethnic groups. 8 Competition among
the different groups for available jobs allowed the growers to keep
wages at the lowest possible level. 9
With the advent of World War 11, an acute labor shortage was created
when men were taken from the fields and the Japanese were relocated in
detention compounds.6" Farmers began to complain about potential
crop losses if the labor shortage was not corrected, and thus prevailed
upon Congress, which reached an agreement with Mexico in 1942 for
the importation of "braceros". 1 The bracero program was in effect until
December 31, 19642 when it was allowed to expire despite strenuous
objections by the grower.
0 3
2. Formation of the United Farm Workers of America
With the end of the bracero program, the labor force in the fields of
on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The author prepared this report on the labor crisis
in the lettuce fields at the request of two Safeway vice-presidents following her place-
ment through the Montgomery Street Center's program for theology student internships
in busines. [Hereinafter cited as Kiely Report].
52. C. McWILLIAMs, FACTORIES IN THE FIELDS, 66-68 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MCWMLLMS].
53. Act of May 6, 1882, c. 126, §§1-15, 22 Stat. 58.
54. McWLLIAMS, supra note 52, at 104-05.
55. Act of May 6, 1882, c. 190, §§1-32, 43 Stat. 153.
56. E. GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR, THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 35 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as GALARZA].
57. GALAR.:ZA, supra note 56, at 41.
58. J. DuNNE, DELANO, TnE STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA GRAPE STRIKE 39 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as DuNNE].
59. DttNE, supra note 58, at 39.
60. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 46.
61. International Agreement between the United States and Mexico respecting
temporary migration of Mexican agricultural workers. Effected by exchange of notes
signed Aug. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1759-1769. The Agreement was formalized by Act of July
12, 1951, Pub. L. No. 65-78 (ch. 223), §§501-509, 65 Stat. 119.
62. 7 U.S.C. §1461 et seq. (1970) (expired). These sections (§1461 et seq. Act
of Oct. 31, 1949, c. 792, Title V, §501, as added July 12, 1951, c. 223, 65 Stat. 119)
terminated Dec. 31, 1964 in accordance with §510[509] of Act Oct. 31, 1949, c. 792,
as amended.
63. DuNNE, supra note 58, at 49.
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California became more stable and thus more amenable to organiza-
tion, 4 although the traditional impediments to the organization of
seasonal employees remained. 5 With nearly seventy percent of the labor
force at the time of harvest comprised of Mexican-Americans, 66 a
second generation migrant farm worker by the name of Cesar Chavez
began an attempt to organize workers in order to exert pressure on the
powerful growers to engage in collective bargaining.67
By 1965, Chavez's National Farm Workers' Association (hereinafter
referred to as NFWA) had enrolled 1,700 families in preparation for a
full-scale strike on the powerful grape growers in Delano, California. 8
In the months which followed, the striking farm workers received
support from various groups across the nation, which sent food and
volunteer picketers to enable the union to continue the strike. 9 Three
months after the strike began, Chavez began the nationwide economic
boycott, and despite an oppressive lack of funds, striking members of
the NFWA were sent throughout the United States to publicize the
plight of the farm worker and to urge dealers to discontinue buying
table grapes and their by-products from Delano growers."'
Despite the growers' contention that only a few hundred workers had
left their jobs to support the strike,7 and that thus the majority of their
workers were not interested in joining Chavez's union, and despite the
purportedly negligible economic effects of the boycott up to that time,72
the DiGiorgio Corporation of Delano consented to a secret ballot elec-
tion to enable its field workers to vote on the question of representa-
tion.7 1 Although the Teamster's Union had been in full support of the
Chavez strike, it now appeared on the scene to be represented on the
ballot as a rival union to the NFWA.74 Recognizing the need for money
and strength to win the election over the Teamsters, Chavez merged his
union with a union composed primarily of Filipino farm workers to
64. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 51.
65. Successful organizing campaigns among farm workers have been hampered by
various factors. Because the work force is migratory, resulting in a short-term em-
ployee-employer relationship, it is difficult for organizers to generate effective leverage
against growers. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 52. Further, since farm workers are heavily
dependent on the harvest season for income, they have been easily discouraged from
striking for financial reasons. Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Agriculture: The Policy
Alternatives, 24 LABOR L.J. 424, 433 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Koziara].
66. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 5.
67. Murphy, An End to American "Serfdom"--The Need for Farm Labor Legis-
lation, 25 LABOR L.U. 85, 86 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
68. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 74-76.
69. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 93-98. But see Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 7,
where it is indicated that the grape boycott did not begin until sometime in 1967.
70. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 127-129.
71. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 89-90.
72. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 130.
73. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 56.
74. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 141.
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become the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (hereinafter
referred to as UFW), and joined the AFL-CIO .7 The newly formed
UFW won the election by a vote of 530 votes for the UFW to 331 votes
for the Teamsters, with twelve votes cast for no union. 0 Being the duly
elected representative of the pickers employed by the DiGiorgio Corpo-
ration, the UFW entered into negotiations for an acceptable contract,
and after seven months of negotiating, a contract was signed.77 By July
of 1970, a majority of the grape growers had agreed to collective
bargaining with the UFW and several contracts resulted."8 The conces-
sion to bargain was presumptively a result of the continuing nationwide
grape boycott-some contracts resulting only after a showing of worker
preference for the UFW as a result of an election."9
3. Judicial Restraints on Affording Relief to Growers under the
Jurisdictional Strike Act
In July of 1970, when the last of the grape contracts were being
signed with the UFW, union organizational activity was occurring in the
vegetable fields of the Salinas and Santa Maria Valleys.80 This time,
however, it was the Teamster's Union which was demanding recognition
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the field workers.81 When
the growers in the Santa Maria Valley refused to concede to the de-
mands of the Teamsters, the Teamsters called a strike of the 35 driver-
loaders, stitchers and gluers who were already represented by the Union,
and threatened to extend the strike into the fields where more than
3,000 field workers were employed in harvesting operations.8 2 Because
other Teamster members such as the packing shed workers honored the
strike, the concerted activity substantially impaired the harvesting opera-
tions of the growers, and by the end of July all the growers in both
Valleys had signed contracts with this union covering their field work-
ers.8 Each grower was aware that the union did not represent even a
substantial number of the field workers on whose behalf the contracts
had been negotiated; nevertheless, no attempt to determine the question
of representation was made.8 4
75. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 155. The UFWOC is currently The United Farm
Workers of America, AFL-CIO. See Cohen, Position of United Farm Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Regarding Farm Labor Legislation (1974) (copy on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
76. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 6.
77. DUNNE, supra note 58, at 168.
78. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 8.
79. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 7-8.
80. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 8-10.
81. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 8.
82. Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 582, 504 P.2d 457, 463, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521,
527 (1972).
83. Id. at 576-83, 504 P.2d at 460-64, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 524-28.
84. The California Supreme Court noted that the question of the field workers'
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When the UFW learned of the contracts between the Teamster's
Union and the vegetable growers, the union moved to the Salinas and
Santa Maria Valleys and in August called a recognition strike to dispute
the majority status of the recognized union. 5 Hundreds to thousands of
workers reportedly walked out of the fields of 35 major vegetable
growers in the Salinas Valley and 62 smaller farms in the Santa Maria
area sG precipitating a move by the growers in both valleys to obtain
injunctions against further UFW activity under the Jurisdictional Strike
Act, alleging that they were neutral employers caught between a contro-
versy arising out of competition between two unions vying for recogni-
tion. 7
When Cesar Chavez appealed the validity of injunctions issued, the
California Supreme Court consolidated two appellate court cases in
Englund v. Chavez8 8 and reversed the lower courts by denying the
injunctive relief against further striking and picketing by the UFW. 9
In Englund, the supreme court attempted to interpret the statutory
limitation embodied in Section 1117 of the Labor Code which precludes
application of the Jurisdictional Strike Act under certain circum-
stances. 0 Under section 1117, an employer may obtain relief only if he
has not dominated, financed, controlled or interfered with either of the
preference for their representative was not even raised as a relevant consideration by
the Salinas Valley growers. Id. at 578, 504 P.2d at 461, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 525. The
court further cited the superior court's finding in the Santa Maria Valley disputes, that
the growers there "made absolutely no effort to ascertain the wishes of their field work-
ers before agreeing to Teamster terms". Id. at 582, 504 P.2d at 464, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 528.
85. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 10, citing the San Francisco Examiner, Aug.
24, 1970, p. 1, col. 7.
86. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 10, citing the San Francisco Examiner, Aug.
24, 1970, p. 1, col. 7 and p. 6, col. 1.
87. In the Salinas Valley disputes, the Superior Court of Monterey County prelim-
inarily enjoined the labor organization from picketing against certain employers, and
when the organization appealed, the appellate court sustained the injunctions under the
Jurisdictional Strike Act in Englund v. Chavez, 101 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1972), vacated 8 Cal.
3d 572, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972). In the Santa Maria Valley disputes, the Superior
Court of Santa Barbara County denied the injunctive relief sought by the employers, and
when the employers appealed, the appellate court reversed and determined that the in-
junctions were proper under the Jurisdictional Strike Act in Furakawa Farms, Inc. v.
Chavez, 102 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1972), vacated Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1972).
88. 8 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972).
89. Id. at 598, 504 P.2d at 475, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
90. Despite California's non-interventionist governmental policy towards labor-
management relations in general, the legislature has recognized that specific tactics of
both management and labor should be regulated where the detrimental consequences to
the parties involved outweigh any social benefit to be gained by governmental inaction.
Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 585, 504 P.2d 457, 466, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 530
(1972). Thus, the California Supreme Court has interpreted the Jurisdictional Strike
Act to provide for governmental intervention to protect an innocent employer from the
potential destructive consequences occasioned by two unions competing for recognition.
Smyrniotis v. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union
of Long Beach and Orange County, 64 Cal. 2d 30, 35, 409 P.2d 949, 952, 48 Cal. Rptr.
725, 728 (1966).
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competing unions. The court noted that the trial courts had found the
Teamsters to be a wholly independent union, neither financed, con-
trolled nor dominated by any grower, and that the large and powerful
Teamsters Union could not be considered a "company union" in any
sense of the word. 1 The court was left with an interpretation of the
words "interfered with," and because the term is not defined in section
1117, the court looked to the meaning of parallel terminology of the
NLRA which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organiza-
tion.12 The court also looked to the legislative intent underlying section
1117, and recognized that an employer may, by more subtle means than
outright domination or control of a labor organization, favor one of two
competing unions and may try to seek relief under the Jurisdictional
Strike Act to eliminate the less desired union. 3 In light of both federal
precedent and policies underlying the state act, the court concluded that
interference exists when the employer conducts himself in such a man-
ner as to illustrate his favoritism for one union over another. 4 Thus it
was determined that the growers had demonstrated the "ultimate form
of favoritism" when they granted exclusive bargaining status to a union
which they knew did not represent their employees, thereby "completely
substituting the employer's choice of unions for his employees' desires.""
Despite the growers' contention that their recognition of the Team-
sters had not resulted from favoritism but rather from fear of the union' s
significant economic and striking power,96 the court, in denying relief,
announced a new requirement that
unless an employer reasonably believes in good faith that a union
enjoys the support of a majority of his employees, his recognition
of that union as the exclusive bargaining agent for such employees
constitutes an "interference with" -that union within the meaning
of Section 1117, and bars him from obtaining an injunction against
a rival union under the Jurisdictional Stnike Act.
97
The court's holding in Englund was significant in two important
respects. First, the decision had no effect on the existing contracts which
had been negotiated with a nonrepresentative labor organization.
91. Id. at 583, 504 P.2d at 464, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (2) (1970) embodies this provision.
93. The court relied on federal cases which have uniformly agreed that "an em-
ployer violates §8(a)(2) of the Act [29 U.S.C. §158(a)(2) (1970)] when he recognizes
one of two competing unions as exclusive bargaining agent if, at the time of recognition,
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that a real question concerning repre-
sentation of his employees existed." Id. at 591, 504 P.2d at 470, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
94. See, id. at 591, 504 P.2d at 471, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
95. See, id. at 591, 504 P.2d at 470, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
96. Id. at 583, 504 P.2d at 464, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
97. Id. at 597-98, 504 P.2d at 475, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
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Whether grower submission to the Teamsters was out of fear or out of
preference, the farmworkers were not consulted. Although the court was
powerless to penalize an employer for recognition of a minority union by
rescinding the nonrepresentative contracts,98 it would appear that the
highest court of the state has acknowledged for the first time the
injustice of a law which perpetuates farmworker voicelessness. 99 Second,
the court failed to establish a method whereby an employer can demon-
strate that "he reasonably believes in good faith that a union enjoys the
support of a majority of his employees." This lack of a method to settle
the question of representation continued to promote hardships between
the parties involved and subjected growers to further disruption during
their harvesting operations. In April of 1973, the grape growers of the
Coachella Valley, after signing contracts with the Teamsters covering
their field workers, alleged that the Teamsters had made a showing of
representative status among those workers by presenting cards signed by
a majority. °00 The UFW called a strike and boycott, which caused the
Riverside County Sheriffs Office to work twelve-hour shifts to maintain
order.1°1 The UFW demanded an election among the workers to deter-
mine whether they in fact desired the Teamsters as their representative,
and although the Teamsters announced they favored an election, they
would only concede to the election under the terms of legislation they
were then advocating in the state legislature." 2 However, it was not until
June 5, 1975, that legislation was enacted to settle the question of
representation.
GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1975
To ensure peace in agricultural fields and bring stability to labor
98. Id. at 593, 504 P.2d at 472, 105 Cal. Rptr. 536. The United States Supreme
Court has declared that recognition of a minority union constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice by the employer and thus the resultant contracts will be void. Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 733-35 (1961). However, the California Supreme
Court has stated that it is for the legislature to require compulsory bargaining. Without
legislative mandates, trial courts, which are hardly labor boards, are ill-equipped to re-
solve such issues as how the majority's choice is to be determined and what shall consti-
tute an appropriate bargaining unit. Petri Cleaners Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Inc.,
Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 472, 349 P.2d 76, 87, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481 (1951). Due to
the absence of state certification procedure, the Englund court was prevented from com-
pletely paralleling the federal system and thus was precluded from nullifying the
growers-Teamster contracts. Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 593, 504 P.2d 457, 472,
105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 536 (1972).
99. See, id. at 595, 504 P.2d at 473, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 537, where the court noted
that this was the first time it had seen an employer grant exclusive bargaining status
to a union which the employer knew to be nonrepresentative and then to seek the state's
injunctive remedy to prohibit otherwise legal concerted activities by a union which
claimed to be more representative of the employees.
100. The Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1973, pt. II, p. 1, col. 6, p. 8, col. 4.
101. Id. at pt. II, p. 1, col. 6, p. 8, col. 5.
102. Id.
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relations, 10 3 the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (ALRA)
was enacted June 5, 1975.104 This Act is designed to bring a sense of
fair play to the unstable conditions in the state by guaranteeing social
and economic justice for all agricultural workers.10 5 Recognizing the
fact that the Act's provisions would benefit farmers and farm workers
alike only if all parties adhered to those provisions, the legislature
expressed the hope that those affected would make a sincere effort to
work through the legislative procedures. 10 6
Being a comprehensive Act, the ALRA sets forth and defines the
rights and duties of agricultural employees, their employers, and the
labor organizations seeking to represent or representing those employ-
ees. Certain activities by labor organizations and employers which con-
stitute unfair labor practices are specifically delineated. 10 7 An Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as ALRB) is
created to conduct elections, investigate unfair labor practice charges,
determine the appropriate bargaining unit and perform other duties
delegated to its appointed members pursuant to the terms of the act. 08
To guide the board in overseeing a mechanism which is new to Califor-
nia, the ALRB is directed to follow applicable precedent of the
NLRA. 09
Diminution of recognition strikes and promotion of majority repre-
sentation were factors underlying the Federal Act's requirement that an
employer must bargain 10 and that he must bargain with the exclusive
agent chosen by the majority of his employees. Although parallel provi-
sions of the ALRA should promote the same objectives,"' the imposi-
tion of an obligation to bargain with the majority's choice is only the
first step in the effort to open up the collective bargaining process. To
assure attainment of the stated objectives, the means employed must be
specified and defined. To promote compliance and incentive, the con-
duct of the parties must be delineated, restricted and sanctioned.
Determination of the majority's choice is a crucial factor affecting
employee rights. By resort to the secret ballot election as the only viable
means of designating that representative,"" the ALRA should prevent
the continued injustice of farm worker voicelessness occasioned by
103. CAL. STATS. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1, §-, at -.
104. CAL. LABOR CODE §1140 et seq., CAL. STArs. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1,
§-, at-.
105. CAL. STATS. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1, §-, at
106. CAL. STATs. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1, §-, at
107. CAL. LABOR CODE §§1153-1155.71
108. CAL. LABOR COD §1151-1151.6.
109. CAL. LABOR CODE §1148.
110. See text accompanying notes 23-25, supra.
111. CAL. LABOR CODE §§1153(e), 1156.
112. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.
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grower choice of a union. Further, the California Legislature recognized
that the timing of the election may be fritical to an effective vote by
seasonal employees, and thus the Act provides that the election must be
conducted when the number of workers currently employed is not less
than 50 percent of the employer's peak agricultural employment for the
current calendar year..
1 3
The main objective and end product of collective bargaining is em-
ployee security via the collective bargaining agreement" 4 -a legally
enforceable contract containing the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 1 5 Although such contracts executed prior to the Act's effective
date may be subject to termination, they will become void only upon
certification of another labor organization." 6 This provision should
prevent automatic termination of some 400 Teamster-grower con-
tracts' 17 and 14 UFW-grower contracts,"" but will enable a representa-
tive union to prevail over a nonrepresentative union. Importantly it will
also allow continuance of employee benefits pursuant to the previously
executed contracts."' To further promote the policy against "collusive,"
nonrepresentative agreements, the California Legislature has determined
that only a certified labor organization may be a party to a lawful
contract.1
2 0
The conflict between the employer's desire for higher profits and the
employee's desire for higher wages may result in a battle over the terms
to be included in the collective-bargaining agreement. To coerce an
employer into submission to demands for better terms, labor organiza-
tions have utilized such economic tactics as the secondary boycott. Cesar
Chavez has argued against any legislation prohibiting the secondary
boycott' 2 ' while growers have supported the Federal Act's restrictive
113. CAL. LABOR CoDn §1156.3(a)(1), 1156.4.
114. The agreement is not a contract of employment in that no individual is guaran-
teed a job, and thus the contract can be viewed as security "covering only a part of the
relationship between the parties to them". WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 774-75.
115. CAL. LABOR CODE §1126. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 772-75 for a discus-
sion highlighting the disagreement of various courts on the actual nature of the collective
bargaining agreement.
116. CAL. STATS. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1, §-, at-.
117. The International Teamster at 19 (June 1975). See also The International
Teamster at 6 (Aug. 1975) where it is reported that new three-year contracts had been
signed with some 175 growers. This settlement replaced a master agricultural agreement
which expired July 15, 1975.
118. The Sacramento Bee, May 20, 1975, p. A18, col. 5, reports that there were only
14 UFW-grower contracts at that time.
119. See text accompanying notes 182-184 infra.
120. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1159. A certified labor organization is one which has won
a secret ballot election. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
121. Chavez's argument is that -his union should be allowed to grow and gain
strength for 12 years without the restrictive Taft-Hartley provisions, just as the industrial
unions did from 1935 to 1947, and that therefore the legislation should require the em-
ployer to bargain, but should not restrict certain employee tactics. Murphy, supra note
67, at 88.
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provisions on the use of this tactic. 12 2 To gain support from both the
UFW and the California growers, the authors of the ALRA reached a
compromise which regulates the secondary boycott, but does not com-
pletely restrict its utilization. 23
The single bargaining unit provision contained in the ALRA prior to
enactment in its present form drew criticism from several labor organi-
zations which were representing agricultural employees on the farm.12 4
The AFL-CIO and other unions who have traditionally represented
construction workers and packinghouse workers originally opposed the
Act in its earlier form because they feared that all employees on the farm
would be included in the same unit.125 In an effort to minimize this op-
position without losing the support of the UFW, which favored a single
bargaining unit provision, the legislature provided the Board with a cer-
tain amount of discretion in carving out units separate from the field
workers' unit.1 6 However, as the Board is accorded no discretion to
exclude machine operators or truck drivers from the field unit,127 a UFW
victory could preclude the Teamster's Union from further representa-
tion by including all of those employees in the same unit.
Pursuant to the ALRA, union shop security provisions may be in-
cluded in the collective-bargaining agreement. 128 The Act provides that
the agreement may require employees to join the union within five days
from the date of employment. 29 The short five day period will prevent
most workers from escaping the mandatory union membership condi-
tion of employment and will thus further promote union security in this
seasonal occupation. However, in order to protect low-paid transitory
workers, the Act provides that employees may not be required to pay
dues twice in the same month. 130 This provision eliminates the potential
economic disadvantage which could arise if an employee works within
one month at two different farms covered by contracts with two differ-
ent labor organizations.
On the federal level, conflicting policies of providing a union with
122. Joint Interim Hearings of the Assembly Comm. on Agriculture and the Assem-
bly Comm. on Labor Relations of the California Legislature, Nov. 12, 1969 at 71.
123. See text accompanying notes 199-219 infra.
124. The Sacramento Bee, May 16, 1975, p. Al, col. 3 and p. A26, col. 1.
125. The Sacramento Bee, May 20, 1975, p. Al, col. 2 and p. A18, col. 5.
126. See JoURNAL op Ta CALIFoRNiA SENATE 16 (Third Extra. Sess. 1975-76)
(May 26, 1975) for a statement of intent concerning the bargaining unit.
127. JorMA. oF TaH CALIFORNIA SENATE 16 (Third Extra. Sess. 1975-76) (May
26, 1975) states that it is the intent of S.B. 1 that the Board may exercise its discretion
in determining bargaining units by considering "processing, packing, and cooling opera-
tions" as constituting employment in a separate area. See text accompanying notes 227
and 228 infra.
128. CAL. LUOR CoDE §1153(c).
129. CAL. LABoR CODB §1153(c).
130. CAL. LABOR CoDE §1153(c).
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needed security by conditioning employment on mandatory union mem-
bership and promoting individual freedom of choice in refraining from
union activity has prompted Congress to require employees to provide
financial support, but Congress has also declared that workers are
otherwise free to remain outside the union without fear of discharge
from employment. 3 ' Since it does not restrict the conditions of member-
ship which may subject an employee to discharge from employment to
non-payment of dues and fees," 2 the ALRA's departure from federal
law in this respect may be indicative of a policy more lenient toward
union security and the growth of a farmworkers' union.
A. Determining the Majority Representative
1. The Secret Ballot Election
One of the first steps in the collective bargaining process is the
determination of the exclusive bargaining agent who will be negotiating
conditions of employment for inclusion in the contract. Insofar as the
collective bargaining agreement will set forth the terms and benefits of
employment under which the employees will work, the ascertainment of
the bargaining agent is a crucial factor affecting employee rights. To
provide for a determination as to which organization will represent the
workers, the ALRA specifies that only the agricultural labor organiza-
tion designated as the majority's choice pursuant to a secret ballot
election shall be a certified representative for purposes of bargaining
under the Act. 3  The Act provides that a union seeking to represent a
grower's employees must submit a petition and that the election must be
held within seven days of the filing of this document."3 "
The federal rules also specify that the exclusive bargaining represent-
ative must be an agent who is desired by the majority of the employ-
ees.135 However, under the NLRA, a labor organization need not be
certified pursuant to a secret ballot election in order to demonstrate its
majority status.3 6 The Federal Act has been interpreted to allow "an
employer to recognize, bargain with, and enter into a contract with a
union which has demonstrated its majority status by presenting to the
employer valid authorization cards signed by a majority of the employ-
ees. 13 7 This interpretation prevailed over the arguments advanced by the
131. See text accompanying notes 257-261 infra.
132. CAL. LABOR CODE §1153(c).
133. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.
134. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.3(a), (a)(4).
135. 2 CCH LAB. L REP., LABOR RELATIONS 12575 at 6347 (1972).
136. See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., aba Kona Surf Hotel and ILWW Local
142, 507 F.2d 411, 412-413 (9th Cir. 1974).
137. Id.
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National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as NLRB),
which maintained that the appropriate method for safeguarding the
issue of representation is by resort to -the secret ballot election. 38
Nevertheless, the argument against the use of authorization cards to
establish majority status has been acknowledged by the United States
Supreme Court. In National Labor Relations Board v. Gissell Packing
Co., Inc.,1' 9 the Court noted the employer's argument that cards are
unreliable and do not necessarily evidence majority status because too
often coercion and misrepresentation may be employed by the union in
soliciting the cards.140 Although the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment,141 it is submitted that the California Legislature has accepted this
proposition by precluding an employer from bargaining with a labor
organization which has not been certified pursuant to a secret ballot
election, and has thereby attempted to eliminate the potential undue in-
fluence and possible threatening techniques which may be utilized by
union organizers in attempts to obtain signed cards from the farm
workers.
Not only has the secret ballot election requirement protected employ-
ees, but it may also have eliminated the adverse consequences of an
unfair labor practice charge against the grower. In Garment Workers v.
National Labor Relations Board,142 the United States Supreme Court
held that if an employer acts without due care in attempting to ascertain
whether the demanding union has majority status, and recognizes a un-
ion which is in fact a minority union, he has committed an unfair labor
practice.143 As the ALRA declares that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to recognize, bargain with, or sign a collec.-
tive bargaining agreement with a labor organization not certified pur-
suant to the Act,144 a grower is notified of the conditions under which
he may lawfully recognize a demanding union. With this provision,
the ALRA has reduced the difficulties encountered by an employer
in determining majority status, and 'thus should encourage the grower to
reject demands for recognition by a powerful though nonrepresentative
labor organization. Further, since the ALRA makes it an unfair labor
practice for an agricultural employer to refuse to bargain with a certified
labor organization,4" a grower will be assured that his bargaining duty
will arise only upon demands by a union certified pursuant to a secret
138. Id. at 412.
139. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
140. Id. at 602.
141. Id. at 604.
142. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
143. Id. at 740.
144. CAL. LABOR CODE §1153(f) (emphasis added).
145. CAL. LABOR CODE §1153(e) (emphasis added).
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ballot election. Thus, the ALRA has established a relatively safe method
whereby the grower may determine when he may lawfully reject a
demanding union's request for recognition.
A criticism and practical problem attending the requirement that an
election must be held in every case focuses on the question of whether
the ALRB will be able to expeditiously handle the vast volume of
petitions expected to be filed.' 46 The ALRA requires the Board to hold
the election within seven days of the filing of a petition, if, after an
investigation of the petition, it has reasonable cause to believe that a
bona fide question of representation exists. 4 ' In those seven days, the
Board must determine: (1) whether the petition has been filed at a time
when the employer's payroll reflects 50 percent of the peak agricultural
employment; 4 8 (2) whether the petition is supported by a majority of
the currently employed employees;' 49 (3) whether the petition has been
filed for the appropriate bargaining unit; 5 ' and (4) whether an eco-
nomic striker's' 51 eligibility to vote meets the requirements as estab-
lished by the Board pursuant to the Act.'52 Although the ALRB
planned to hire 25 three-member teams to conduct the elections, with
each team holding two elections per day, 5 1 the seven-day requirement
may prove a burdensome task. Due to the advantages to both the field
workers and the growers, it is submitted that requiring the secret ballot
election in every case is an appropriate and reliable method of determin-
ing the question of representation. However, only viewing the mecha-
nism in operation will reveal whether it is also a practical method.
146. The International Teamster at 19 (June 1975).
147. CAL. LABOR COoD §1156.3(a) (4).
148. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.3(a)(1). California Labor Code Section 1156.4
would allow the Board to consider peak employment for the prior season, but specifies
that the Board must go further and estimate the peak employment on the basis of acre-
age and crop statistics which shall be applied uniformly throughout California.
149. California Labor Code Section 1156.3(a) provides that the petition may be
signed by or accompanied by cards signed by a majority of those currently employed.
Therefore, a union must demonstrate majority status before the election is even held.
California Labor Code §1156.3(b) provides that a rival may appear on the ballot by
demonstrating support of 20 percent of the employees at least 24 hours prior to the elec-
tion.
150. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1156.2.
151. Economic strikers are workers who have left their employment in order to en-
force a demand for some economic concession. I CCH LAB. L. REP., LABOR RELATIONS
1665, at 5551 (1971).
152. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1157. According to this provision, economic strikers who
have been on strike for three years may be allowed to vote. It has been suggested that
this provision was crucial to Chavez, whose workers had been on strike against the Gallo
Wine Company. The Sacramento Bee, May 22, 1975, p. A3, col. 5-8. In response to
criticism of this provision, Rose Bird, Secretary of Agriculture, reported that this provi-
sion does not automatically allow a three-year economic striker to vote, but rather to
present justification to the ALRB for being allowed to vote. The Sacramento Bee, May
27, 1975, p. A12, col. 4. The Board's decision will presumably be required before the
election may be held.
153. The Sacramento Bee, Aug. 8, 1975, p. A20, col. 1.
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2. Timing the Election
Under the ALRA, the petitioning union requesting an election must
allege in the petition that the number of persons currently employed is
not less than 50 percent of the employer's peak agricultural employment
for the current calendar year.'" To ensure that the election is in fact
held during this critical period, the Board is required to conduct the
election within a maximum of seven days from the date a petition is
filed.'55 The purpose for requiring the election to be held during the
peak of the season, when the number of employees greatly exceeds the
number regularly employed, is to ensure that the greatest number of
agricultural workers will be available to vote in order to select the
most representative union.
Although the Federal Act itself does not specifically designate the
appropriate time within which an election should be held, the NLRB has
maintained that when an employer is engaged in a seasonal occupation,
the Board should direct an election at or about the peak of the season in
accordance with the usual practice for seasonal occupations. 1 0 Thus the
ALRA is in accord with the federal precedent concerning the appropri-
ate election time for seasonal occupations.
The ALRA specifies that once the union is certified as the winner of
the election, another election may not be directed for a 12-month
period,' 5" and thus the certified union is given 12 months in which to
negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement with the employer without
the interference of rival unions. It is at this point that the requirement to
bargain in good faith comes into play. 58
It has been argued that to require the election to be held during the
peak of.the harvest with negotiations over terms of the contract occur-
154. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.3(a)(1).
155. See J. Cohen, Position of United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Re-
garding Farm Labor Legislation 7-8 (1974) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal)
where it is acknowledged that if the election were not statutorily mandated to be held
immediately following the filing of the petition, the process could conceivably extend
over such a long period of time that not only would those persons who have signed the
petition have moved on, in the case of short harvest crops, but also the entire season
may be over.
156. E.g., Bordo Products Co., and Int'l Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal,
Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 117 N.L.R.B. 313, 317
(1957). In Bordo it was further held that a union submitting the petition may demon-
strate its majority status among those currently employed, even though there will be a
great increase in the number of employees at the peak of the season, but that the actual
election will have to be postponed until such time as the peak employment exists.
157. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.6. This provision parallels the Federal Act, 29
U.S.C. §159(e) (2).
158. California Labor Code Section 1153(e) requires an employer to bargain in
good faith with a certified labor organization and Californi Labor Code Section 1154
(e) requires a certified labor organization to bargain in good faith with an employer.
Further, California Labor Code Section 1155.2(a) defines the obligation to bargain in
good faith.
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ring immediately thereafter may subject a grower to the mercy of all
union demands in order to avoid a complete crop loss.159 Although
this argument is not without merit, it is questionable how effective an
economic strike would actually be when called of workers who depend
primarily on income from employment during the harvest season. If the
field workers were, however, properly organized and informed of the
magnitude of their potential leverage at this critical period, reluctance to
risk a loss of pay may be overcome in view of the possible greater long-
term benefits which may be achieved if they were to hold out for the
demanded terms. The growers' argument is further refuted by an ex-
amination of the effect that recognition strikes have had on grower
submission to union demands in the past. Although an economic strike
is one called to protest conditions of employment'6" and thus may occur
at the bargaining stage, the effect of the walkout is the same as the
recognition strike, which is called for the purpose of forcing the employ-
er to recognize the union. A history of the labor disputes in California
reveals that the UFW has called many recognition strikes during the
harvest period which have not resulted in subjecting the growers to the
mercy of the union's demands for recognition.' 6 '
The ALRA does not deny the right to strike during harvest season. 6 2
The authors of the ALRA have declared that to prohibit an employee
from striking when his services are needed is effectively to deprive him
of his right to strike. 63 Further, the authors have noted that a grower
subjected to an economic strike during the harvest period possesses the
right to hire strikebreakers.164 Although subsequent legislation may
have abrogated this right,'65 it is questionable whether this right provid-
159. Joint Interim Hearings of the Assembly Comm. on Agriculture and the As-
sembly Comm. on Labor Relations of the California Legislature 32, Nov. 12, 1969.
160. See Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Agriculture: The Policy Alternatives, 24
LABOR L.J. 424, 428-29 (1973). Professor Koziara states that there are gen-
erally few restrictions on economic strikes because they are important in the collective
bargaining process in that they provide incentive for labor and management to reach
an agreement.
161. The Englund court found that 27 growers responded to the UFW recognition
strike in July of 1972 by seeking injunctions from the superior court. Englund v.
Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 580, 504 P.2d 457, 462, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 526 (1972). See
also DUNNE, supra note 58, for a history of the Delano strike.




165. On September 27, 1975, S.B. 719 was enacted. CAL. STATS. 1975-76, c. 1094
§ 1150 et seq., at -. Chapter 1094 will add Chapter 8 to Part 3 of Division 2 of the
Labor Code commencing with §1150. It should be noted that although the Labor Code
Sections of Chapter 1094 (§§1150-1167), overlap certain Labor Code Sections of the
ALRA (§§1140-1166.3), the ALRA is enacted at Part 3.5 of Division 2 of the Labor
Code, while Chapter 1094 adds Part 3 to the Labor Code.
A discussion of the overlapping Labor Code sections enacted by Chapter 1094
pertinent to the subject matter of this comment follows.
CAL. LABOR CODB §1163 provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any employer will-
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ed the grower with an effective remedy in his attempt to hold out against
the striking union. A large corporate grower who hires thousands of
workers during the harvest season may encounter an insurmountable
burden in attempting to replace this number of employees during the
short, critical period of the harvest.
On the other hand, this problem may be reversed since the Act allows
a 12-month certification period during which the grower and the certi-
fied union are obligated to bargain. Should an impasse be reached
between the grower and the union in negotiations conducted during the
off-season, when a great number of seasonal employees are absent from
the farm, a work stoppage would be of no avail to the demanding union.
This lack of employee leverage would thus greatly diminish the bargain-
ing power of the union.
B. Contracts Currently Existing-No Bar to An Election
The ALRA provides that no collective-bargaining agreement execut-
ed prior to the Act's effective date shall bar a petition for an election.'10
The Act further declares that such agreements are not to be automatical-
ly cancelled on the effective date of the Act, but rather that they shall be
void upon the ALRB's certification of an election. 167 The effect of this
provision is that some 400 Teamster-negotiated farm worker con-
tracts' 68 existing at the effective date of the Act are subject to voidabili-
ty.
On the federal level, the NLRB has adopted a contract-bar doctrine
which provides that as a general rule, a contract will bar a petition for
an election for the duration of its term.169 The contract-bar doctrine has
been established by the Federal Board as a method of stabilizing the
employer-union relationship by protecting that relationship from claims
by a rival union.
017
ingly and knowingly to utilize any professional strike-breaker to replace an employee
or employees involved in a strike or lockout at a place of business located within this
state." CAL. LABOR CODE §1160 defines a "professional strikebreaker". According to
this definition, it would appear that the legislature meant to restrict the use by employers
of persons who repeatedly offer themselves for employment for the duration of a strike
or lockout for the specific purpose of replacing employees on strike. It could be con-
cluded that by defining "professional strikebreakers" as repeated offenders, the Legisla-
ture did not intend to completely preclude employers from hiring persons to replace his
employees on strike, and thus growers may still be able to protect themselves to some
extent during a harvest time strike. For further amplification on this subject, see RE-
viEw OF SELEcTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LE ISLATION, this volume at 459.
166. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.7(a).
167. CAL. STATS. 1975-76 Third Extra. Sess., c. 1, §-, at -.
168. See note 128 supra. There were reportedly 14 UFV-grower contracts as of
May 20, 1975. The Sacramento Bee, May 20, 1975, p. A18, col. 5. This provision of
the ALRA should affect all prior existing contracts equally.
169. The Absorbent Cotton Co., Petitioner and Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO and its Affiliated Local 193, 137 N.L.R.B. 908, 909 (1962).
170. MoRus, supra note 17, at 167.
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The ALRA's provision that a prior executed contract will not bar a
petition would appear to be contrary to the federal contract-bar doc-
trine, and has been criticized as violative of both the state and federal
constitutional provisions1"' which provide that the state shall pass no
law which impairs the obligation of contracts. 7 2 Nevertheless, it has
been declared that the contract-bar doctrine, being a creation of the
Board, may be applied or waived in the NLRB's discretion in any given
case in order to best serve the interests of stability and fairness in
collective bargaining. 17 In International Ladies' Garment Workers Un-
ion AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 74 the United States
Supreme Court held that a contract will not bar a petition for an
election 7 5 in a situation closely analogous to the circumstances existing
when the growers entered into the Teamster contracts. In Garment
Workers the employer had recognized and signed a collective bargaining
agreement with a union at a time when the union did not have the
support of a majority of the employees. 76 Despite the employer's bona
fide yet mistaken belief that the union did have majority status, the
Court, agreeing with the ruling of the NLRB and the Federal Court of
Appeals, held that such recognition constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice. 77 The Court upheld the Board's remedial order'78 which required
the employer to discontinue recognition of the union and to cease giving
effect to any agreements entered into with the union.79
It cannot be said with certainty whether the 400 Teamster-grower
contracts in California were entered into in the absence of a determina-
tion that the Teamsters in fact represented a majority of the field
workers covered by the contracts. However, in light of the California
Supreme Court's finding in Englund v. Chavez'80 that there was no
indication that the growers attempted to ascertain whether their respec-
tive field workers desired such representation before entering into the
collective-bargaining agreements involved therein,'' and in light of the
171. Assemblyman Maddy, A Legislative Report on A.B. 159, 1975-76 Reg. Sess.
(copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §16.
173. Montgomery Ward & Co. and Retail Store Employees Local 1099, Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 137 N.L.R.B. 346, 349 (1962).
174. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
175. Cf. id. at 735-40.
176. Id. at 733-34.
177. Id. at 733.
178. Id. at 740.
179. Id. at 735.
180. 8 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972).
181. See note 84 supra. The United States Supreme Court in Garment Workers
made nearly the same factual finding as did the California Supreme Court in Englund
when it found that the employer had made no effort to ascertain with any degree of
certainty whether the union's assertion of majority support was in fact true. 366 U.S.
731, 734 (1961).
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fact that California law did not require an agricultural labor organiza-
tion to attain majority status for purposes of executing a collective-
bargaining agreement, it is highly likely that these agreements were in
fact entered into without the growers ascertaining the representative
status of the union. Thus, inasmuch as the United States Supreme
Court's remedy precluded further recognition of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement until a Board-conducted election demonstrated the un-
ion's majority status, the provision of the ALRA which will void the
contracts if another union should win the election is supported not only
by the policy of the NLRB of promoting fairness in collective bargain-
ing, but by the United States Supreme Court as well.
The Teamsters have argued that termination of existing contracts will
place farm worker wages and fringe benefits in jeopardy until the units
are reorganized and new contracts are negotiated.'8 2 However, in Gar-
ment Workers the Court held that although the agreements no longer
had effect, the terms and conditions of employment under the contract
were not required to be abandoned.1 83 The wages and other conditions
of employment could remain the same and the employees would thus
retain the benefits of the collective-bargaining agreement. Although the
Garment Workers case involved a union which did not at the time of
employer recognition represent a majority, the union had achieved
majority status among the employees by the date the agreement was
consumated, and thus it could be assumed that it would win the Board-
ordered election. 84 This fact may have been determinative with respect
to the Court's willingness to allow continuation of the terms of the void
contract, since there was a substantial likelihood that the union-employ-
er relationship would resume. Applying this reasoning to the Teamster-
grower contracts, it may be observed that the same result could be
achieved if the Teamsters win the election among the farm workers
covered by the previously executed contracts. Insofar as the ALRA
provides that the contracts shall be canceled only upon another union's
certification, if the Teamsters in fact enjoy a majority status among the
farm workers the Teamster-grower relationship need not be terminated
at all. On the other hand, if another union should win the election, the
existing contracts will become void. Further, discontinuance of the terms
and conditions may result where the employer elects to terminate the
benefits, until such time as a new contract can be negotiated with the
newly certified union. Despite the fact that certain benefits may be
achieved for the laborers even by a nonrepresentative union, termination
182. The International Teamster at 19 (June 1975).
183. 366 U.S. 731, 735 n.7 (1961).
184. Id. at 735.
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of the contract with that labor organization should hardly be criticized.
If true self-determination is the goal, it is the farm workers who must be
allowed the determination of representation by a union of their
choice.
A three-year contract had been negotiated between the Teamsters and
some 175 growers covering approximately 30,000 farm workers in
California and Arizona prior to the ALRA's effective date.185 Under
this agreement, the basic wage is $2.85 per hour with piece rate increases
of four to six percent. 8 6 Other terms include such benefits as hospital
medical services, two paid holidays and time-and-a-quarter pay for
Sunday work. 18 7 Although these contracts and some 400 others were
executed prior to the ALRA's effective date, they will, as noted earlier,
remain in existence until a rival union is certified. It should be noted
that a switch of unions in those cases where the contracts existed
previously would have attendant disadvantages. 88 If another union is
designated as the representative, the previously existing contracts be-
come void and thus the workers would not be covered by any collective-
bargaining agreement during the period in which the exclusive bargain-
ing representative and the grower are engaged in negotiations. Insofar as
an agricultural employer is required to bargain in good faith with a
certified representative for twelve months, 18 9 it could be many months
before an agreement is reached and conceivably the period could elapse
without the parties reaching an agreement.
C. Elimination of "Sweetheart Contracts" and Diminution of Recogni-
tion Strikes
ALRA Section 1153(f) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with a labor
organization not certified pursuant to a secret ballot election. This
provision should prevent collusive "sweetheart" contracts and may di-
minish the occurrence of further recognition strikes.
The term "sweetheart contract" appears to be a slang labor term for
an agreement negotiated between the employer and a labor organiza-
tion, the purpose of which is to keep a rival union out or to promote the
individual welfare of the union officials, rather than to promote the
185. The International Teamster at 6 (Aug. 1975). See note 1 supra.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. ALRA records reportedly show that as of September 14, 1975, the Teamsters
had won 11 elections including 10 where they already had contracts, at the ranches in
the table grape area. The Sacramento Bee, Sept. 14, 1975, p. A2, col. 4.
189. CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.6. See text accompanying notes 157 and 158.
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interests of the employees represented by the labor organization.100 The
UFW has charged that collusion between the agribusiness interests and
the Teamster's Union has resulted in the execution of "sweetheart con-
tracts". 91 The UFW finds support for this allegation in the California
Supreme Courts finding in Englund v. Chavez which described the
grower's recognition of the nonrepresentative Teamster's Union as "the
ultimate form of favoritism, completely substituting the employer's
choice of a union for his employees' desires.""' By specifying that a
grower may recognize only a certified union, the ALRA has assured
that the growers may no longer be accorded the right to choose their
workers' representative.
Although the Federal Act does not require formal certification before
an employer may enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with a
union, a non-certified union may suffer the disadvantage of a lawful
recognition strike by a rival union. 193 This disadvantage is particularly
important in California where the UFW and the Teamster's Union have
been engaged in a jurisdictional dispute for recognition, and it is this
departure of the ALRA from federal precedent which may prove to be a
significant factor in the diminution of further recognition strikes.
Since recognition striking was one of the most prolific causes of labor
unrest prior to the passage of the Federal Act, the use of this tactic was
regulated, though not prohibited, by the NLRA. For example, the
NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a rival union
to engage in recognition striking where another union has been certified
as the employees' representative. 194 This prohibition does not apply
where the employer has recognized and entered into a collective-bar-
gaining agreement with a union whose status has not been certified
pursuant to a Board-conducted election.' 95 In according a union whose
majority status has been formally established a more permanent and
stable status than that accorded to a non-certified representative, the
Federal Board has promoted its stated policy that the Board-conducted
election is the most appropriate method of determining the question of
representation.' 96
190. See B. MnxTzEa, LABOR LAw, CASES MATERLS AND PROBLEMS 154-170
(1970) for discussion of company-dominated unions [hereinafter cited as MELrzER].
191. J. Cohen, Position of United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Regarding
Farm Labor Legislation 14 (1974) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
192. Id. quoting Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 591, 504 P.2d 457, 470, 105
Cal. Rptr. 521, 534 (1972),
193. See Perry Norvell Co. and United Shoe Workers of America, C.I.O., 80
N.L.R.B. 225, 239-40 (1948).
194. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(c) (1970).
195. Perry Norvell Co. and United Shoe Workers of America, C.I.O., 80 N.L.R.B.
225, 239-40 (1948).
196. NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., ada Kona Surf Hotel and ILWW Local
142, 507 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Reference to the jurisdictional dispute between the UFW and the
Teamster's Union in California, where the UFW has continually en-
gaged in recognition strikes to dispute the Teamster-grower contracts,
warrants the conclusion that a departure from federal law was needed.
Had the ALRA not totally prohibited contracts with non-certified repre-
sentatives, it is likely that the growers would have continued to submit to
Teamster demands. Thus, not only would continued recognition striking
by the UFW have been a predictable occurrence, but under federal
precedent the activity would be sustained .as warranted and lawful. Like
the Federal Act, the ALRA provides that a rival union may not lawfully
engage in recognition striking where another union has been certified. 9 7
But because the Act prohibits the grower's recognition of a non-certified
union, the ALRA may substantially reduce this prolific cause of farm
labor unrest.
To counterbalance the restriction on recognition of a non-certified
union, the ALRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a non-
certified union to engage in recognition striking.198 A grower subject to
demands and threatened strikes by a powerful non-certified union would
be placed in the precarious position of either submitting and recognizing
the uncertified union, thereby risking an unfair labor practice charge, or
holding out and risking economic destruction occasioned by implemen-
tation of the threatened strike. By restricting an uncertified union's
striking activity, the ALRA has provided the needed protection to a
grower attempting to comply with the provisions of the Act.
D. The Secondary Boycott
The secondary boycott is one of the various concerted forms of action
utilized by a labor organization to enforce an objective related to the
interests of organized labor.199 A secondary boycott may be generally
described as an economic tactic against an innocent employer with
whom the labor organization does not have a dispute (the secondary
employer) in order to coerce that employer to stop doing business with
the employer with whom the labor organization does have a dispute (the
primary employer).20 9 Through utilization of the secondary boycott, a
labor organization may cause non-delivery of the primary employer's
goods to the secondary employer, may discourage consumer buying of
197. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d)(3).
198. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d)(2).
199. See Messner v. Journeyman Barbers, Etc., Int'l Union of Am., Local 256, 53
Cal. 2d 873, 876, 351 P.2d 347, 349, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1960).
200. See MELTR, supra note 190, at 424.
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the primary employer's goods, and may discourage all consumer trading
with the secondary employer who sells the primary employer's goods.
California has imposed few restrictions on labor activities, 20 1 and but
for a brief time during the Second World War,2 °2 the secondary boycott
has not been prohibited. 20 The ALRA has now imposed certain restric-
tions on secondary boycott activity by agricultural labor organizations.
For example, the ALRA prohibits the harsh type of secondary boycott
by declaring it to be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
effect the non-delivery of goods to the secondary employer.20 4 The Act
does, however, permit the consumer boycott by allowing publicity to
discourage the public from buying a particular product of the primary
employer, and permits the consumer boycott where the effect is to
encourage the public to cease all trading with the secondary employer,
if the labor organization has been certified pursuant to the Act.200
The ALRA is in compliance with the Federal Act insofar as the
secondary boycott in its harsh form is prohibited. 0 6 It has been suggest-
ed by one federal court that the prohibition of the secondary boycott in
this form was instituted out of concern for protecting farmers from this
sort of boycott by "teamsters and unloaders. '' 20 T California growers, who
have expressed dismay over the passage of any bill which would not
prohibit the secondary boycott,208 may now be assured that their prod-
ucts may not legally be prevented from being delivered and unloaded at
the place of business of the retailer.0 9
201. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
202. CAL. LABOR CODE §§1131-1134, §1136 were added by CAL. STATS. 1941,
c. 623 at 2079, §1, declaring the "hot cargo" and "secondary boycott" unlawful. The
purpose of the chapter was to insure the unobstructed production and distribution of
products of the factories and of the fields during that critical period of national emer-
gency. Although the statutes were not repealed until 1965, CAL. STATS. 1065, c. 1277,
§1, at 3161, the provisions were declared to be unconstitutionally overbroad in 1947 by
the California Supreme Court. In re Blancy, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 658, 184 P.2d 892, 902.
203. The objective sought must be reasonably related to a legitimate interest of or-
ganized labor, and thus the activity is not absolutely unrestricted. See Messner v.
Journeyman Barbers, Etc., Int'l Union of Am., Local 256, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 876-77, 351
P.2d 347, 349, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1960). The economic pressure may be restrained
where past conduct of picketing was occasioned by extreme violence, or where the
picketing involves untruthful statements. In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 649, 184 P.2d
892, 896. Picketing may also be restrained to some extent under the Jurisdictional
Strike Act. See United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO v. Super. Ct.,
4 Cal. 3d 556, 438 P.2d 1215, 94 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1971).
204. See CAL. LABOR CoDE §1154(d).
205. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d) (4).
206. See 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(A) (1970).
207. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 869, 1951).
208. See Joint Interim Hearings of the Assembly Comm. on Agriculture and the As-
sembly Comm. on Labor Relations of the California Legislature, Nov. 12, 1969 at 71.
209. Lawful concerted activity having an unlawful effect is prohibited pursuant to
CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d)(4). Thus, legal picketing with picket signs requesting the
consumer not to purchase products or goods of the primary employer which had the ef-
fect of inducing truck drivers to refuse to deliver has been declared an unlawful see-
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The ALRA is less restrictive than the NLRA with respect to the
consumer boycott. The United States Supreme Court has held that
communication of a labor dispute to the public is within the purview of
the constitutional right to free speech when engaged in peacefully and
through the appropriate means, 210 and the Federal Act therefore de-
clares that publicity which truthfully advises the public that the second-
ary employer is distributing products of an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute shall not be prohibited.21' This
provision of the NLRA, however, specifically prohibits publicity in the
form of picketing.212 The United States Supreme Court has construed
the provision to prohibit picketing intended to prevent customers from
patronizing the retailer, but has announced that picketing intended to
induce consumers to cease purchasing the products of the primary
employer sold by the secondary employer may be allowed.21 3  The
Court's rationale was that by focusing the boycott on the offending
product as opposed to requesting the public not to trade with the
secondary employer, the union's appeal was confined to its dispute with
the primary employer.2 4 The Courts decision could be viewed as an
acknowledgement that a successful consumer boycott must necessarily
be engaged in through the mechanism of picketing as the most effective
method of communicating the grievance to the public.
The consumer boycott is nearly unrestricted under the ALRA. As the
state must comply with the constitutional requirements, picketing is
allowed which is intended to prevent the public from purchasing the
product of the offending grower.21 5 However, the ALRA goes further
than the Federal Act insofar as it permits picketing which has the effect
of requesting the public to cease all trading with the secondary employ-
er.218 The ALRA, however, provides that only a labor organization
certified as the representative of the primary employer's employees may
engage in boycotting activity intended to discourage all consumer trad-
ing with the secondary employer.21 7 Because the provision only applies
to a certified union, the union would have already won the election and
the specific objective of 'the tactic would be to secure the demanded
ondary boycott pursuant to the parallel Federal provision of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158
(b)(4)(D). Brewery and Beverage Drivers, Teamsters Local 67 v. NLRB, 220 F.2d
380 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
210. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
211. 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (D) (1970).
212. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(D) (1970).
213. NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
214. Id. at 63.
215. CAL. LABoa CODE §1154(d)(4).
216. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d)(4).
217. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(d)(4).
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terms of the bargaining agreement from an uncooperative grower (as
opposed to securing recognition).218 This added leverage afforded the
labor organization would be of particular significance when negotiations
with the grower are being conducted in the off-season. During the off-
season, when the grower has a minimum number of employees, a
threatened walkout at the primary employer's farm would have little or
no effect. By affording a certified union the right to engage in a con-
sumer boycott prohibited under the federal law, the California legisla-
ture has attempted to more evenly balance the economic power between
labor and the growers by specifically correlating the Act's provisions to
the unique circumstances of labor relations in a seasonal occupation.210
A recent policy decision announced by the General Counsel of the
NLRB in seeking injunctions against boycotts by the UFW could signifi-
cantly affect California growers. The policy declared was that when a
union admits some NLRA covered employees to its membership, it
could be brought under the secondary boycott section of the Federal
Act.22 The institution of such a policy, which would be dependent on
the legality of applying the restrictions and not the protections of the
Federal Act to a labor organization, would be beneficial to California
growers. The growers, given a choice of federal or state regulation of
agricultural labor relations, have indicated a preference for removal of
the Federal Act's agricultural exemption.221 This preference is couched
in the argument that because many states have unregulated labor rela-
tions,222 it is necessary to prohibit the secondary boycott on a federal
level to prevent boycotting of California farm products transported to
other states.223 Although this argument has failed to persuade Congress
218. California Labor Code Section 1153(e) makes it mandatory for an employer
to recognize and bargain with the representative of the employees choosing, therefore,
recognition striking and picketing engaged in to obtain that goal should not be necessary.
Not only is secondary activity engaged in for that purpose an unfair labor practice (un-
less the union is certified and the employer still will not recognize it [CAL. LABOR CODE
§1154(d) (2)]), but so also is primary activity for that purpose unless the union is certi-
fied [CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(h)]. In order to promptly halt striking by a labor or-
ganization, the ALRA provides that should the employees be engaged in a strike when
a petition is filed for an election, the Board shall attempt to hold the election within
48 hours of the filing of the petition [CAL. LABOR CODE §1156.3(a)(4)].
219. But see Murphy, supra note 67, at 87, where the author suggests that because
a successful consumer boycott is largely dependent on public support, which may be fall-
ing off due to the rise in consumer prices, a consumer boycott may in fact currently
be an ineffective method of coercion.
220. Murphy, supra note 67, at 88.
221. Joint Interim Hearings of the Assembly Comm. on Agriculture and the As-
sembly Comm. on Labor Relations of the California Legislature, Nov. 12, 1969 at 70-72
(testimony of Mike Bozick, President, Desert Grape Growers Association).
222. See Koziara, supra note 65, at 426 where Professor Koziara indicates that only
six states have laws regulating collective bargaining in the agriculture area.
223. Joint Interim Hearings of the Assembly Comm. on Agriculture and the Assem-
bly Comm. on Labor Relations of the California Legislature 70-71, Nov. 12, 1969, testi-
mony of Mike Bozick, President, Desert Grape Growers Association.
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to repeal the exemption, the spectre of organization drives by the two
rival unions in sister farm states may prove sufficient to persuade
Congress that the repeal of the exemption may prevent a reoccurrence of
the turmoil and violence which has been experienced in the fields of
California.
E. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
The appropriate bargaining unit has been described as the "formal
arena of employee organizational efforts . . . at the base of the entire
collective bargaining process" .224 The bargaining unit is that group of
employees which a labor organization will seek to organize and repre-
sent in negotiations for a contract with their employer. The determina-
tion of which employees should comprise the unit may be a subject of
dispute between an employer and the union or between two rival unions
since this determination may establish whether a union is entitled to
majority status.225 For instance, when a union has organized a small
group of employees and seeks to represent that group in an election, the
employer may contend that the "unit appropriate for bargaining" should
be comprised of all of his employees. Since the requesting union may
have organized only a small number of employees, and since a majority
of a larger bargaining unit may not desire union representation, the
employer who prevails in this contention may have assured that the
union will lose the election. Similarly, where one union has organized a
small group of employees, and the second union a larger though differ-
ent group of employees, the second union might contend that the unit
appropriate for bargaining should be composed of both groups. Since
the second union would enjoy the support of the larger group, the
inclusion of the small group in the same unit would oust the first union
from all representation.
Section 1156.2 of the ALRA provides that the bargaining unit shall
be comprised of all the agricultural employees of the employer and that
the Board may determine the appropriate unit or units where agricul-
tural employees are employed in two or more noncontiguous geographi-
cal areas.226 In adopting this provision, the legislature intended that the
Board, in exercising its discretion to determine the bargaining units in
noncontiguous geographical areas, may consider processing, packing,
and cooling operations which are not conducted on a farm as constitut-
ing employment in separate or noncontiguous geographical areas for
224. MoRus, supra note 17, at 200.
225. MoRRs, supra note 17, at 200.
226. CAL. LABoR CODE §1156.2.
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purposes of section 1156.2.227 Section 1140.4 of the ALRA may also be
significant to the determination of which employees may be included or
excluded from the bargaining unit. This section provides that the term
"agriculture" shall include preparation for market and delivery to stor-
age or to market or to carriers for transportation to market. Since
employees performing tasks of delivery to storage or market (truck
drivers), do not fall within the discretionary exclusion of processing,
packing and cooling workers,228 it may be concluded that delivery truck
drivers are to be included within the single bargaining unit provision of
section 1156.2. Section 1140.4 goes on to exclude from the definition of
"agricultural employees" any person who performs work to be done at
the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repairing of a build-
ing or structure. Employees performing such construction tasks on a
farm are thus excluded from the provisions of the ALRA and may not
be included in the single bargaining unit.
On the federal level, the task of determining the unit appropriate for
bargaining has been delegated by the NLRA to the federal board.229 It
has been suggested that the determination by the NLRB of the appropri-
ate bargaining unit is not only one of the most important aspects of
labor law, but also one of the most problematic, constituting a heavy
proportion of the work of the NLRB.230 In exercising its discretion to
determine the appropriate unit, the NLRB has delineated certain factors
which it considers. For example, the Board may consider: (1) whether
there is a sufficient community of interests among the employees;2. ' 1 (2)
whether there is a history of a workable bargaining relationship between
the employer and the petitioning union;" 2 and (3) whether the extent
of union organization among the employees should be decided in favor
of the employer or the labor organization.2 3 The bargaining unit provi-
227. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 16 (Third Extra. Sess. 1975-76) (May
26, 1975).
228. JoURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 16 (Third Extra. Sess. 1975-76) (May
26, 1975). It should be noted here that the NLRB, notwithstanding the agricultural em-
ployee exemption of the NLRA, has ruled that an employer operating a farm where em-
ployees are engaged in labor which involves the change of a farm product by cooking
or canning not incidental to farming and who is engaged in interstate commerce will
be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Act insofar as those particular employees
are concerned. G.L. Webster Co., and Teamsters Local 822, 133 N.L.R.B. 440, 441-
42 (1961). California Labor Code Section 1140.4(b) provides that only agricultural
employees who are excluded from coverage under the Federal Act shall be included
under the ALRA, and insofar as the ALRB's determination is correct on that point, a
possible conflict through the inclusion of employees subject to federal jurisdiction in a
bargaining unit will be eliminated.
229. 29 U.S.C. §159(b) (1970).
230. J. ABODEELY, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNrr 1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as ABODEELY].
231. See 2 CCH LAB. L. REP., LABOR RELAnONS 12605, at 6707 (1972).
232. Bear Creek Orchards Employer and Teamsters, Cannery and Fruit Packing
Work ers, Local 962-A, 87 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1349 (1949).
233. Libby, McNeil and Libby and Local 929, Produce, Poultry, Fish and Oyster-
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sion under the Federal Act has resulted in the carving out of separate
units comprised of different types of employees in each unit.2 4 Thus
one employer's plant may have several bargaining units with a different
union representing each type of employee and each unit.
The single bargaining unit provision of the ALRA should result in a
significantly simplified task for the California Board (as compared to
the NLRB) by eliminating many of the time-consuming and complex
multi-unit considerations which constantly require determination by the
Federal Board. Because of the single unit provision, the ALRB will
include seasonal and full-time employees in the same unit and will
eliminate the determination, often encountered by the Federal Board, of
whether seasonal employees have a sufficient community of interest to
warrant inclusion in the same unit as regular full-time employees. 235 But
for the discretionary exclusions of processing, packing and cooling
operators, employees performing different tasks on a farm will be
included in the same unit, thereby eliminating the consideration, often
encountered by the NLRB, of whether certain machine operators consti-
tute an appropriate "craft unit" or whether they should be included in
the plantwide unit.236 Further, the California Board will not be faced
with the task of determining which union's petition should be honored
when different unions file for the inclusion of separate employees for
purposes of establishing the appropriate bargaining unit. In this respect,
the single bargaining unit provision has probably promoted the likeli-
hood of compliance with the maximum seven-day requirement between
the filing of the petition and the holding of the election.
The growers will also be affected by the single unit provision of the
California act. Under the multi-unit determinations by the Federal
Board, employers are often required to bargain with a number of unions
at one plant. But for the discretionary exclusions, the single unit provi-
sion should mean that the employer will be obligated to negotiate the
contract with only one labor organization. The single unit provision
may, however, work to the disadvantage of a grower in the event of an
economic strike. With several separate units, negotiations over a contract
men Drivers and Helpers, AFL, 64 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1332 (1945); Libby, McNeil and
Libby and Teamsters Local 760, 59 N.L.R.B. 864, 866 (1944).
234. See Momus, supra note 17, at 222-36 for general discussion of the types of
units created by the NLRB.
235. See, e.g., California Almond Growers Exchange and Cannery Workers and
Warehousemen's Union, Local 857, AFL, 73 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1370 (1947); Franklin
County Sugar Co., and Beet Sugar Refinery Employees Local 23818, 92 N.L.R.B. 1341,
1343 (1951).
236. See American Potash and Chemical Corp. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 50 and Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 477, AFL and Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists and Int'l Chemical Workers Union AFL, 107 N.L.R.B. 1423-1425 (1954).
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may reach an impasse with one labor organization, resulting in a work
stoppage by that group of employees, while the remaining workers
continue on the job. With a single unit, however, the occurrence of an
economic strike may result in a work stoppage by all of the grower's
employees.
The provision that the bargaining unit shall include all agricultural
employees of the employer was a provision strongly supported by Chavez
and the UFW.237 The UFW maintains that minority people have
traditionally been relegated to the hardest stoop labor jobs and that
Anglos have generally been employed to work the tractors and other
cultivating and harvesting machines. 238 The UFW claims that the carv-
ing out of separate units for persons working machines results in minor-
ity workers being precluded from upward mobility to more desirable
jobs, and thus argues that workers should be allowed the opportunity to
move within one bargaining unit.23 9 Because the only discretionary
exclusions from the unit encompass processing, packing and cooling
operators, the single unit provision of the ALRA should result in the
inclusion of machine operators and delivery employees in the same unit
with the field workers.2 40 If the UFW in fact enjoys majority support
among the farm workers, upon certification as the exclusive bargaining
agent the union should be able to assign its members to the machine-
6perating jobs. Because the unit will also be composed of the minority
field workers, those workers will be afforded the opportunity to operate
the machines as well.
Machine operators and truck drivers have traditionally been organ-
ized and represented by the Teamster's Union.2 41 A predictable conse-
quence of allowing more discretion on the part of the ALRB would have
237. J. Cohen, Position of United Farm Workers of America, AFLCIO, Regarding
Farm Labor Legislation 3-4 (1974) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id.
240. The NLRA [29 U.S.C. §203(f)] includes within the definition of agriculture
"preparation for market and delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transpor-
tation to market." Thus, because of the agricultural exemption of the NLRA, employees
performing these tasks will be subject to the ALRA and the Act's bargaining unit provi-
sio.
241. See ABODEFLY, supra note 230, at 42-48, for discussion of NLRB's changing
position and standards to be applied regarding separate unit determinations for a firm's
truck drivers. See Marks Oxygen Co. of Alabama and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO 147 N.L.R.B. 228 (1964), where the Board included the firm's truck drivers in
the plantwide unit although they were under separate supervision and received pay on
a different basis than the production and maintenance employees, finding that truck driv-
ers nonetheless had a sufficient community of interests with the production and main-
tenance employees. The Board noted that the petitioning union desired inclusion of the
truck drivers in the plantwide unit and that the petitioner's desires are always relevant.
Under the language of the ALRA the ALRB will be precluded from consideration of
a petition for an election among a unit consisting solely of truck drivers, despite the
employees' desires, and despite the petitioning union's desires.
230
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been the carving out of a separate unit for representation by the Team-
sters. The statement by Einar Mohn, Director of the Western Confer-
ence of Teamsters, on February 5, 1973 that "you can't expect whites to
step aside and let Mexican-Americans and Negroes have the [machine]
jobs they have had for years"24 is indicative of the factors which
underlie the UFW's concern for the effect that separate units could have
on the job opportunities which are afforded minority field workers. In
the event of a UFW victory, the single bargaining unit provision could
indeed operate to force those traditional machine operators to step aside.
F. Union Security Agreements
One of the terms to be negotiated between the employer and the labor
organization for inclusion in the collective-bargaining agreement is a
union security provision. A union security provision may require all
employees to join the labor organization as a condition of employment.
These various provisions may be in the form of a closed shop provision
or a union shop agreement. Under a closed shop provision, an employer
may not hire an employee unless and until he becomes a member of the
labor organization.243 Under a union shop agreement, an employer is
free to hire nonunion members, but such employees retain their employ-
ment only upon the condition that they become members of the union
within a certain specified time.2 " As employees are required to become
members of the union, they must comply with certain requirements of
membership imposed by the labor organization.245 Such. requirements
may include the paying of union dues or initiation fees, as well as
attendance at union meetings. An employee who fails to meet the
conditions of union membership may face discharge from employment
where the union security provision requires the employer to employ only
union members.
The NLRA of 1935 permitted closed shop agreements.24 6 In 1947,
the Taft-Hartley Amendment outlawed the closed shop but provided
that an agreement may be made to require, as a condition of employ-
ment, membership in the union within 30 days from the date of employ-
ment.247 The purpose of prohibiting the closed shop agreement was to
242. Kiely Report, supra note 51, at 20 (an interview with Einar Mohn, Director
of the Western Conference of Teamsters on February 5, 1973 by Jane Yett Kiely).
243. FoRKoscf, supra note 3, at §141.
244. FoRKoscH, supra note 3, at §144.
245. FORKOSCH, supra note 3, at §145.
246. FoRxoscH, supra note 3, at §144. Professor Forkosch indicates that under
the NLRA of 1935 the type of union security statutorily permitted was unlimited. It
was primarily a question of bargaining or economic strength.
247. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136, currently
29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1970).
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prevent discrimination in membership on the part of a labor organiza-
tion.248 Under a closed shop provision, the labor organization would
often be providing the employer with union members through the
utilization of the union hiring hall. 249 The union shop provision would
allow an employer to hire nonunion members at the outset, and thus,
although the employees must join the union within a minimum of 30
days, a union shop enables employees to obtain employment directly
through the employer without first seeking membership with the union
and facing possible discriminatory exclusion.
California law has recognized the closed shop agreement as an ac-
ceptable form of union security.2 50 The ALRA, however, prohibits the
closed shop and allows the union shop in agricultural labor relations. 51
The union shop provision which is allowed under California's Act is
similar to that specified under the NLRA, but contains certain modifica-
tions in order to comply with union security in a seasonal occupation.
Under the Act, a collective-bargaining agreement may require, as a
condition of employment, membership in the union within five days
from the beginning date of employment or from -the effective date of the
collective-bargaining agreement.25 2 During harvest seasons, migrants
move among employers within short spans of time, and thus incorpora-
tion into the ALRA of the NLRA's minimum 30-day grace period could
have resulted in some employees escaping the requirements of the
provision if they moved on prior to its effective date. By shortening the
minimum grace period, the ALRA should more effectively promote the
purpose of union security.
Essential to the security of a union is the financial support it receives
from its members. Under the federal rules, an employee may be dis-
charged from employment under a union security agreement only for
failure to meet union membership requirements relating to the payment
of dues and initiation fees.253 For the purposes of the union security
248. MoRuus, supra note 17, at 701.
249. With the outlawing of the closed shop under the Taft-Hartley Act, exclusive
use of the hiring hall was precluded. However, hiring hall arrangements, nondiscrimina-
tory to nonunion members or members of union minority groups, continue to exist and
to serve as a means for eliminating time consuming and wasteful job searching and
scouting by employees and employers. Hiring hall arrangements are particularly utilized
by the construction and maritime industries under federal law. MoRuus, supra note 17,
at 712. The federal policy allowing regulated hiring hall arrangements would be of par-
ticular significance and benefit to the grower and to the farm worker alike where vast
numbers of employees must be hired within a short span of time.
250. Messner v. Journeyman Barbers, Etc., Int'l Union of Am., Local 256, 53 Cal.
2d 373, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
251. See CAL. LABOR CODE §1153(c). Like the NLRA, the California Act does not
use the terms "closed" or "union" shop.
252. CAL. LuOR CODE §1153(c). The NLRA contains a similar provision for the
construction industry with a seven day grace period. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970).
253. 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (3) (1970).
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provision, the California act defines "membership" as the satisfaction of
all reasonable terms and conditions uniformly applicable to other mem-
bers in good standing.254 Both the NLRA and the ALRA prohibit a
labor organization from requiring an excessive discriminatory payment
of dues as a condition of membership. 55 Under these provisions a labor
organization is prevented from indirect discrimination in subjecting an
employee to discharge from employment because he cannot meet the
mandatory conditions of membership in the labor organization.
Section 1153(c) of the ALRA 256 states that no employee who has
been required to pay dues to a labor organization by virtue of his
employment as an agricultural worker during any calendar month shall
be required to pay dues to another labor organization by virtue of
similar employment during the same month. In enacting this provision,
the Califbrnia Legislature has recognized the potential economic disad-
vantages of the union security provision as it applies to transitory
agricultural laborers.
Mandatory union membership as a condition precedent to obtaining
employment has raised the argument that union security agreements
violate the individual's freedom to refrain from union activity.2 57 Con-
gress has countered this proposition by announcing that union security
provisions are warranted in an effort to prevent "free riders". 258 The
allowance of exceptions to the condition of union membership would
enable some employees to reap the benefits of the union's efforts to
obtain employee security and fringe benefits without being required to
participate in the union's support. Congress has, however, attempted to
balance the conflicting goals of union security and individual freedom
by providing in the NLRA that only the failure to tender periodic dues
and initiation fees to the union will justify discharge from employ-
ment.259 Congress has specifically rejected labor's argument that allow-
ing employees to remain outside the union destroys union security and
substantially decreases the organization's impact as representative.8 0
Thus, the federal cases have held that where a union member tenders
dues and fees, he may not be discharged from employment for failure to
meet such union membership conditions as providing money to a strike-
254. CAL. LABOR CODE §1153(c).
255. CAL. LABOR CODE §1154(e); 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (5) (1970).
256. CA. LABOR CODE §1153(c).
257. Union Starch and Refining Co. and John Ralph. Grain Processors Independent
Union Local 1 and John Ralph. 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 784 (1949).
258. Cf. id. at 785 n.17.
259. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1970).
260. Union Starch and Refining Co. and John Ralph. Grain Processors Inde-
pendent Union Local and John Ralph. 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 786 (1949).
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support fund26 1 or paying a fine as a sanction for a union violation.26 2
The California Legislature may have adopted a more lenient policy
toward union security. ALRA Section 1153(c) defines such member-
ship as "satisfaction of all reasonable terms and conditions uniformly
applicable to other members in good standing. 263 The failure to define
"reasonable terms and conditions" may indicate that the legislature
intended that a union should be able to obtain an employee's discharge
for reasons unrelated to the nonpayment of dues and fees. The legisla-
ture's failure to adopt an amendment to the ALRA which would have
exempted certain employees, due to their religious convictions against
striking, boycotting and picketing,26 4 may be a clue that the intended
construction of the language embodied in section 1153(c) is that a
union may require all employees to engage in such coercive tactics as a
condition of employment.265 Such a construction is indicative that the
California Legislature has adopted a labor argument which was specif-
ically rejected by Congress. It is further support for the propostion
that the legislature, by enacting section 1153 (c), by making a secondary
boycott concession to labor, and by refusing to prohibit harvest-time
strikes, has attempted to provide the struggling farmworkers with that
additional economic leverage which is necessary to balance the power
and strength of the California growers.
CONCLUSION
Requiring an employer to recognize and bargain with a representative
of his employees' choice is only the first step toward providing a fair and
workable scheme within which labor and management can function
peaceably and effectively. The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of
1975 is a comprehensive act in that it contains provisions relating to all
aspects of the grower-agricultural organization relationship. As in the
case of the Federal Act, a balancing theme is implicit in the ALRA.
This balancing of often conflicting goals was necessary under the Fed-
261. NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers, Lodge 113, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1956) (cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833, 1956).
262. NLRB v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. and Local 72, Int'l Union, United Auto., Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., CIO, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1950).
263. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1153(c).
264. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 12-15, (Third Extra. Sess. 1975-76) (May
26, 1975).
265. The Sacramento Bee, May 22, 1975, p. A3, col. 6-8, reported another rejected
amendment which would have placed a stricter curb on the right of a union to take away
a worker's union membership card. Under some contracts, the loss of union member-
ship could result in a worker losing his job. Introduction of the amendment by a repre-
sentative of grower groups, which would be disadvantaged by striking activity, is an indi-
cation that the growers are fearful that California Labor Code Section 1153(c) embodies
a lenient legislative policy towards employee coercive tactics.
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eral Act in order to promote self-determination and to place manage-
ment and labor in substantially equal positions to insure that both sides
to a labor dispute would have equal economic bargaining power.
Analysis of the ALRA indicates that the California Legislature has
put forth a sincere effort at settling the question of representation by
providing farm workers the right to self-determination. By the use of the
secret ballot election, employees should be free from the influence of
overly persuasive union organizers and may thus freely vote on the
question of which union shall be their representative. Requiring the
election to be held at the peak of the season should insure that the
greatest number of employees will be entitled to express their desires.
Further, the elimination of potential "sweetheart contracts", should
allow workers to be represented and covered by a contract only where
they have voted on the question of representation.
The ALRA should minimize the recurrence of further recognition
strikes. By requiring that only a certified union may be a party to a valid
contract, a rival union should have no cause to dispute its majority
status. This departure from federal precedent was necessary to prevent
the continuing jurisdictional dispute between the UFW and the Team-
sters. The ALRA has provided for the voidability of contracts existing
prior to the Act's effective date. This provision should allow a rival union
to formally test the majority status of the current representative, where
that status is subject to dispute, and should further abrogate contracts
entered prior to the effective date of the Act for the sole purpose of
avoiding compliance with the Act's provisions. Not only has the voida-
bility of collective-bargaining agreements been held constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court, but voidability has been required under
the federal law where a real question of representation existed.268
While the legislature has protected the grower under the Act by
prohibiting the harshest type of secondary boycott, it has at the same
time granted a concession to labor by allowing a less restrictive consumer
boycott. With this concession, the California Legislature has provided
labor organizations with the needed leverage for negotiations occurring
during the off-season, and has thus more equally balanced the power
between labor and management.
The single bargaining unit provision of the ALRA will be advanta-
geous to all parties involved, except perhaps the Teamsters Union. The
Agricultural Labor Relations Board will be relieved of the task-found
cumbersome by the Federal Board-of reconciling multi-unit considera-
266. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961).
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tions, and may thus more expeditiously handle the election petitions to
comply with the timing provisions of the Act. The employer will negoti-
ate with fewer representatives, and the minority employees, who have
for years constituted the working force supporting California agribusi-
ness, may have an opportunity for higher paying jobs on the farm.
The granting of collective-bargaining rights to agricultural employees
has frequently raised the argument that the legislature will thereby
hasten mechanization with its resultant long-term loss of job opportuni-
ties, thereby minimizing the gain of short-term benefits obtained pur-
suant to the collective-bargaining process. This argument is not without
validity. However, it should be pointed out that much of agribusiness
has been operating under collective-bargaining agreements between the
Teamsters and the growers, in the absence of a collective-bargaining act.
Because many contracts had been negotiated prior to the effective date
of the Act, compliance with its provisions will merely substitute the
grower's choice of a union with the field workers' own determination of
their representative.
Although the foregoing discussion of the ALRA encompasses only a
part of the California Legislature's attempt to afford stability and to
bring peace to California growers and farm workers alike, it is submit-
ted that this legislation has accomplished a feat worthy of commenda-
tion. The ALRA has been fashioned after a national act which has
proved to be workable in governing collective-bargaining in this country
since 1935. Not only has the ALRA incorporated into its provisions
applicable precedent of the Federal Act determined to be necessary in
relation to a seasonal occupation, but it also departs from federal
precedent in areas where such a departure was deemed necessary in
order to resolve those problems unique to California agricultural labor
relations.
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